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Abstract. Good corporate governance requires an improvement of the 
definition and the enforcement of the employees‟ responsibility throughout the 
companies‟ processes. In the field of information technology, one translation of 
this requirement targets a strict alignment of the access control policy with the 
permissions needed by the employees to achieve the obligations linked to their 
responsibilities. There has been much work related to access control over three 
decades and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) has emerged as a reference 
model in that discipline. Although its advantages have been largely recognized, 
when taking into account the new governance constraints, it appears that its 
mechanism of assignment of users‟ permissions is improvable. In this paper, we 
propose enhancements of RBAC by taking into account the concept of 
responsibility and explain it can be modeled using the OWL Web Ontology 
Language. 
Keywords: Role, Access Control, Policy, Responsibility, Commitment, 
Capability, Accountability, Separation of Duty. 
1   Introduction 
IT governance frameworks [40,41] require companies to have employees‟ 
responsibility aligned with the IT constraints. This requirement concerns all layers, 
from the employees‟ responsibilities identified in the business processes up to their 
translation onto technical policies applied to IT applications and infrastructures. In 
previous work [1], we address that requirement with a responsibility model (figure 2) 
built around three sets of concepts: (i) accountability of the employee regarding an 
obligation derived from a responsibility; (ii) the rights required to fulfill the 
obligation; (iii) the commitment pledged by the employee to fulfill the obligation. 
Whereas the first two sets are common in the field of IT, the last one comes from 
social aspects that underline the importance of dealing with the engagement of the 
employee in the responsibility assignment process. 
The review of the literature performed in [39] highlights that the specification of 
technical policies does not include the notion of responsibility as advised by 
governance requirements. In this paper, we propose an integration of our 
responsibility model with RBAC [2] to minimize the three weaknesses identified in 
section 4. RBAC is an access control model that simplifies structuring the access right 
for a domain. Policies are elaborated using a policy language such as XACML 
(Extensible Access Control Markup Language) [36]. The basic RBAC model can be 
extended by modeling using OWL (Web Ontology Language) [35] that enables going 
beyond the basic semantics of RDF schema to perform reasoning tasks necessary to 
enforce specific constraints such as the separation of duty (SoD) or role hierarchies. 
We also use OWL for the representation of our responsibility-RBAC model. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the RBAC model and its 
user to role and permission to role assignment process. Section 3 presents our 
responsibility model, section 4 integrates both models into a single one, section 5 
compares the representation of our model with two representative existing works and 
the last section concludes. 
2   Background: RBAC 
2.1   The RBAC Model 
The concept of role has been introduced in software engineering about 35 years ago 
and has followed the development of traditional access control techniques such as the 
Mandatory Access Control or Discretionary Access Control. Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC-Fig 1.) has been introduced in the NIST standard for role-based 
access control [2] and embodies the entire previously developed notions in a single 
model which is now the reference access control mechanism for most software 
applications. The publication of this standard has been followed by many related 
papers which adapt the model for specific fields (e.g. eCommerce, [3]), to propose 
alternative solutions according to other constraints (Context Aware RBAC, [4]), or for 
proposing solutions for managing some of its aspects (e.g. ARBAC [5], URA97 [6] or 
PRA97 [7]. 
 
Fig. 1. RBAC model 
RBAC is a high level model with the objective to simplify the management of 
granting permissions to users. This is especially necessary in multinational companies 
where the amount of employees often count in thousands. It provides access decisions 
based on two associations – the association of users to roles based on the function that 
users assume and based on their responsibilities, and the association of permissions to 
roles describing that a role has the permission to perform specific operations on 
objects. This means that it is easy to change the assignment of people to roles without 
changing permissions.  
2.2   User-Role and Permission-Role Assignment 
The process of assigns users to roles and permissions to roles is normally a 
managerial function performed by the business manager or the process owner to 
decide which employee needs to access what application to achieve her job. The 
actual implementation of this may be delegated by the application business owner to a 
security administrator. URA97 [6] and PRA97 [7] are both part of the ARBAC97 [5] 
model (Administrative RBAC) that permits the assignment of the users to roles and 
permission to role by means of administrative roles and permissions. Both URA97 
and PRA97 are defined in the context of RBAC96 model family but are applicable for 
most of the RBAC model. Their philosophy is the creation of administrative roles 
managed by security officers. These administrative roles are granted administrative 
permissions to assign or remove user to/from roles. In the same way that RBAC96 
defines role hierarchies, ARBAC97 defines administrative role hierarchy so that a 
senior security officer inherits permissions from a junior security officer below him in 
the role hierarchy. For example, if the junior has assigned an employee to a 
inappropriate business roles, the senior security officer can remove that employee 
from the role or change the permissions associated with it. URA97 gives a detailed 
explanation of the administration of the assignment process. 
The simplest way for a manager to assign permission to a user is to assign that user 
in to a role that encompasses specific tasks to perform and has the required 
permissions to perform the tasks. By doing so, the manager implicitly obliges the user 
to accept the responsibility to perform the tasks but does not actually know whether 
the employee has agreed to this. Not taking into account the employee‟s commitment 
is an authoritarian way of managing staff and may result in company goals not being 
achieved due to unwillingness of employees to perform assigned tasks (see section 
3.3). Although this may seems unavoidable, especially in large companies, it could 
easily be improved by incorporating acceptance of responsibility by a user within the 
role assignment process, as shown in this paper.  
3   Responsibility model 
In this section, we present our generic responsibility model as a proposed 
enhancement to RBAC. The complete responsibility model (figure 2) is presented in 
detail in [1]. The analysis of the concept of responsibility [1,10] highlights that there 
is a plethora of definitions for it. A commonly accepted definition of responsibility 
encompasses the idea of having the obligation to ensure that something happens. The 
responsibility model is built around three sets of concepts. The first set concerns 
accountability of the employee regarding the obligation targeted by the responsibility, 
the second set concerns the rights required to fulfilled the obligations and the third set 
concerns the commitment to be pledged by that employee. 
3.1 Concept of obligation/accountability 
We define an obligation as a duty to perform an action. Dobson et al. [11] classifies it 
following two perspectives: functional obligation as what a role must do with respect 
to a state of affairs (e.g. execute an activity) and a structural (managerial) obligation 
as what a role must do in order to fulfill a responsibility such as directing, supervising 
and monitoring. 
Accountability and answerability are similar concepts that are composed of one or 
more obligation(s) to report the achievement, maintenance or avoidance of some 
given state [12] to an authority. For our model, we prefer the definition of 
answerability provided by Cholvy as an obligation or a moral duty to report or 
explain the action or someone else’s action to a given authority [10] and the 
definition of accountability from Laudon and Laudon [15] as a feature of systems and 
social institutions: It means that mechanisms are in place to determine who took 
responsibility of actions. Accountability thus includes answerability as well as the 
possibility of sanctions for non-fulfillment of obligations [13]. Stahl [14] argues that 
accountability describes the structures, required to facilitate responsibility and that 
responsibility is the ascription of an object to a subject rendering the subject 
answerable for the object. Stahl also focuses on the sanction as being of central 
importance for responsibility. He nuances the sanction as positive or negative.  
3.2 Concept of right 
We define the right as what is due to a employee. This concept is common but is not 
systematically embedded in the IT frameworks [16, 34]. It encompasses facilities 
required by an employee to fulfill his accountabilities. These facilities could include, 
amongst others, capabilities, authorities or the right to delegate. 
Capability describes the possession of requisite qualities, skills or resources to 
perform an action [12,16,17] and relate to a user. This may be implied through access 
rights, authorizations or permissions [18,19]. 
Authority describes the power or right to give orders or makes decisions. This 
concept is introduced in CIMOSA [16] as the “power” to command and control other 
employees and to assign responsibilities.  
Delegation is a right to transfer some part of the responsibility to another employee 
that pledges commitment for it (see section 3.3). This transfer may concern the 
transfer of right or of accountability or both. The delegation of an obligation may or 
may not be accompanied by the delegation of right for the delegatee to further 
delegate the same obligation [12]. 
 
Fig. 2. UML responsibility model 
3.3   Assignment/delegation process 
We define assignment as the action of linking an employee to a responsibility and 
delegation is the transfer of an employee‟s responsibility assignment to another 
employee. 
The commitment by an employee related to that assignment or delegation 
represents his moral obligation to fulfill the action and the assurance that he performs 
it with respect of an ethical code. The commitment remains a virtual concept, difficult 
to define as well as to integrate in a strictly formalized framework. In [20], Meyer and 
Allen acknowledge that commitment should be conceptualized as a psychological 
state concerned with how people feel about their organizational engagements. To 
bypass the integration difficulty, we propose to extend the model with the 
components that can be used to enforce the commitment.  
 Commitment’s antecedent in the literature relate to pragmatic variables [21] that 
may influence a person‟s commitment e.g. the age of the employee and the time he 
spent in the organization [23,24,25], the perception of job security [26], management 
culture and style [27], the employee‟s investments in time, money and effort [28] or 
how his experience is valued by the company [22]. A scientific survey of commitment 
also highlights that Commitment outcomes may really influence the quality and 
efficiency of the action achieved. Pfeffer in [29] explains that Employee commitment 
is argued to be critical to contemporary organizational success. The following list 
summarizes commitment outcomes: 
• Employee performance [30] – committed employees performed better when 
committed to both their organization and their profession. 
• Retention of the employee – many studies demonstrate the link between the 
commitment and the employee‟s turnover [28,30,31].  
• Citizen behavior1 – research over these outcomes remain however inconclusive 
[32]. 
                                                          
1 According to [7] definition, it represents the individual behavior that is discretionary, not 
directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and in the aggregate promotes 
the efficient and effective functioning of the organization 
Based upon the commitment outcomes and antecedent definition, we may assume 
that commitment for responsibility of an action means will increase trust in the 
achievement of an obligation or in the accountability attached to the responsibility, as 
well as increase efficiency (and consequently capabilities) for this employee to 
perform the action. 
4   Mapping RBAC with the responsibility model 
In this section we propose a novel model called responsibility-RBAC (figure 3). As 
seen in section 2, the three main elements of RBAC are User, Role and Permission 
(dashed boxes in figure 3) and the two main functions are User-role assignment 
(URA) and Permission-role assignment (PRA) indicated by dashed arrows in figure 3. 
Although RBAC presents many advantages such as facilities to grant or to remove 
permissions to a large number of employees, it also presents weaknesses regarding the 
following business IT alignment constraints: 
1. Number of roles: the inflexibility of the model may result in more roles than 
users if all permission assignments are very distinct [33] or in order to 
accommodate a user specific constraint [38]. Moreover, in small organisation, 
the concept of role does not always map onto access rights. 
2. Employee‟s commitment: RBAC does not offer cater for management of the 
employee‟s commitment regarding the tasks they are responsible for. 
3. The representation of RBAC in OWL results in the following problems: 
inconsistencies in ontology [8], difficulty of detection of constraint violations 
using DL-reasoner [8], as well as the need to deploy complex architectures [9] 
 
Fig. 3. UML responsibility-RBAC model 
The three next sub-sections analyze the contribution of the responsibility-RBAC 
model to improve RBAC above listed weaknesses  
4.1   Number of roles optimization 
RBAC requires an employee (type of business USER) who needs a permission to 
achieve a task to be assigned to a role. Thus, if an employee needs to have 
permissions to perform a task which is independent of existing roles, then a specific 
role must be created or the task must be associated with an existing role, even if the 
latter is not directly related to the task. This is mainly due to the lack of granularity of 
RBAC that may lead to situations where the number of roles is larger than the number 
of users, or where roles do not reflect real job functions because they are assigned 
permissions for a too heterogeneous set of tasks. 
Our proposal to solve those problems is to introduce the concept of responsibility 
as an intermediary concept between the user and the role in RBAC (figure 3). We 
consider that the role is a predefined set of responsibilities, that employees can be 
assigned specific responsibilities, independent of roles and that permissions are 
associated with the responsibilities for which they are required. This model allows us 
to refine the URA concept of RBAC: users are assigned to responsibilities as far as 
they commit to them. The responsibility is an abstract concept that could be either a 
concrete atomic responsibility or a concrete role (group of responsibilities). The PRA 
concept of RBAC is refined through associating permissions both to atomic 
responsibilities and to roles. 
The tuple of concepts [user-role-responsibility] facilitates defining two types of 
user-role assignments and one type of responsibility-role assignment: 
1. Direct role assignment: an employee is assigned to a role and gets the 
corresponding responsibilities and permissions. In that case, the role is often 
the main function of the employee and corresponds to his main function in 
the company.  
2. Direct atomic responsibility assignment: An employee is assigned an atomic 
responsibility without any associated role and the employee then gets the 
corresponding permissions. 
3. Indirect role assignment: an employee is assigned, by direct atomic 
responsibility assignment all the responsibilities that compose a predefined 
role, so he is implicitly assigned to the role and he gets the permissions 
corresponding to those responsibilities. This case reflects the situation where 
an employee is assigned to more and more responsibilities which happen to 
the responsibilities predefined in a role. Whereas from an IT point of view, 
the set of these responsibilities correspond to a role, the employee does not 
have the title corresponding to the role, from an organizational viewpoint. 
The direct role assignment corresponds to the user-role assignment mechanism 
proposed in RBAC. The advantage of this solution a large number of permissions for 
users are granted or managed. For example, suppose that the role of project manager 
is composed of three responsibilities: 
- management of the team, 
- management of the project outcomes, 
- management of the budget. 
The employee who is assigned to that role receives all the permissions necessary 
for the management of the budget, the management of the team, and the management 
of the outcomes. If a new responsibility is added to the role, the employee is 
automatically assigned to it. 
The direct atomic responsibility assignment: the user is assigned to an atomic 
responsibility and receives the permissions necessary to perform the tasks linked to 
that responsibility. E.g. an employee who is not project manager but who however 
performs the management of the outcomes is assigned responsibility for that task and 
receives the permissions necessary to perform it. This situation could occur for 
example in the case where the project manager assigns the management of the 
outcomes to a subaltern. In RBAC, representing this situation requires the definition 
of an explicit role for the management of outcomes. If the equivalent situation occurs 
for the budget management and for the team manager, the number of roles could 
considerably increase and the advantage of using roles for granting or removing 
permission to a user will diminish. 
The indirect role assignment corresponds to a user-role assignment that exists 
when an employee is assigned to all responsibilities that compose the role. Whereas 
RBAC only offers the possibility to assign users to roles, the responsibility-RBAC 
model permits additionally to refine the granting of permissions to atomic 
responsibilities and to automatically assign an employee to a role when that employee 
performs all the atomic responsibilities that compose that role. E.g. an employee who 
is separately assigned responsibility for the budget management, then for the 
outcomes management, and afterward for the team management is, as result, 
implicitly assigned to the project manager role. In that perspective, the employee is 
assigned to a role from an IT point of view but that employee to role assignment is 
not recognized by the company. Detecting and officially acknowledging that 
employee to role association (and consequently make it a direct role assignment) is an 
improvement of the business IT alignment. If a new responsibility is added to the role, 
then it will be automatically assigned to the employee in the case of direct role 
assignment but not in the case of indirect role assignment. 
There are three types of responsibility/role de-assignment: direct removal of role, 
direct removal of responsibility and indirect removal of role. In that last case, when 
all the responsibilities of a role are removed from an employee, this role is from an IT 
point of view no longer assigned to the employee whereas from an organizational 
point of view, this employee is still assigned to the role.  
The delegation of responsibility is not the same as the removal of responsibility. In 
the case of delegation, the employee keeps the obligation of supervision [12]. 
4.2   Employees’ commitment to the responsibility 
In order to explain how the commitment may be included the user to 
role/responsibility assignment process, a conceptual assignment process is proposed 
as illustrated in figure 4. When being assigned to a role or to an atomic responsibility, 
the employee needs to explicitly commit to the achievement of the task(s) related to 
the role or to those related to the atomic responsibility. This concept of commitment 
does not exist in RBAC as it considers the assignment of an employee to a role as an 
action performed solely by the employee‟s manager. Based on our review of the 
significance of the commitment in section 3.3 and according to the responsibility 
model, we propose to integrate the commitment in the employee to responsibility 
assignment process. The stakeholders involved in that process are indicated in figure 
3 as grey boxes. The employee is assigned responsibility to achieve a task by the 
delegator who remains responsible and accountable for the management of the task, 
as in CobiT [34]. The employee’s manager is responsible for the management of the 
employee. Sometimes the task manager and the employee's manager is the same 
person. The RBAC administrator is the security officer who manages the access 
rights. 
 
Fig. 4. Responsibility assignment process represented as a UML Activity diagram 
An employee to responsibility assignment process may start with a request from a 
delegator to transfer the obligation related to a task to an employee (figure 4). This 
transfer is possible if the employee„s manager accepts the assignment of the 
responsibility to the employee and if that employee explicitly commits to fulfill the 
task. The first condition corresponds to a double control which is: the employee 
availability and the employee capability. In some cases, the employee is also the 
manager and consequently, decides whether to accept or reject new responsibilities 
according to availabilities. The second condition corresponds to the commitment 
pledged by the employee according to his perception of the environment, guarantees 
received, interest in the task, etc. (see commitment antecedent in section 3.3). 
Once the delegator receives the agreement from the employee‟s manager and the 
commitment from the employee, the delegator requests the RBAC administrator to 
provide the permissions needed to achieve the task. As soon as the permissions are 
granted, the employee is assigned the responsibility (figure 4). 
4.3   Responsibility-RBAC representation with OWL 
The Web Ontology Language OWL is a semantic markup language for publishing 
and sharing ontologies on the Web. OWL defines classes, properties (binary relation 
that specifies class characteristics), instances (individuals that belong to the classes) 
and operations. Recent research efforts [8,9] concern the translation of RBAC model 
onto policy languages using OWL. [8] argues that Policy languages grounded in 
Semantic Web technologies allow policies to be described over heterogeneous domain 
data and promote common understanding among participants who not use the same 
information, and using OWL will help in developing security frameworks with well 
understood and verifiable security properties for open, dynamic environments, which 
require coordination across multiple organization […]. 
To represent the responsibility-RBAC model and remain aligned with the current 
research, we retain some elements of the ROWLBAC representation and extend it 
with the definition of a new domain for the responsibility-RBAC model, called rrbac 
(figure 5). ROWLBAC provides following classes: Action, Subject, Object (lines 1 to 
3) and two subclasses of action: permission and prohibition (lines 5 to 8). We also 
prefer the representation of the role as a class (1
st
 approach of [9], line 4) and the 
representation of the separation of duty (SoD) by the property disjointWith. The SoD 
is the concept of having at least two people required to complete a task to prevent too 
much power for a single person. In order to bypass the addition of new rules and to 
avoid the problem of detection of constraint violation by the DL-reasoner (see section 
5), the SoD is represented at the responsibility layer. SoD can be static (SSoD) or 
dynamic (DDoD) if it is function of the run time environment. We do not consider the 
representation of the dynamic SoD in this paper. To represent the responsibility in the 
new rrbac domain a new owl class is needed (line 12). The user to responsibility and 
the responsibility to role assignments are represented by lines 13 to 18. 
 
1 Action a rdfs:Class 
2 Subject a rdfs:Class 
3 Object a rdfs:Class 
4 rbac:Role a owl:Class 
5 PermittedAction rdfs:subClassOf Action 
6    owL:disjonctionWith ProhibitiedAction 
7 ProhibitiedAction rdfs:subClassOf Action 
8    owL:disjonctionWith PermittedAction 
9 Subject rdfs:property, owl:FunctionalProperty 
10    rdfs:domain Action 
11    rdfs:range Subjects 
12 rbac:responsibility a OWL:Class 
13 rbac:role owl:ObjectPropety rdf:ID=”isComposedOf” 
14    rdfs:domain rbac:role 
15    rdfs:range rrbac:responsibility 
16 rrbac:responsibility owl:ObjectPropety rdf:ID=”isAssignedTo” 
17    rdfs:domain rrbac:responsibility 
18    rdfs:range rrbac:employee 
Fig. 5. Responsibility-RBAC representation in OWL 
Figure 6 illustrates the permission to responsibility association that is represented by 
the creation of a subclass of PermittedAction. E.g. Buy material for a project is 
created and only allowed to employees that are assigned to the role BudgetManager is 
represented with an OWL class expression to create classes of permitted actions (lines 
14 to 25) for a specific action and whose subjects are employees assigned to the 
concerned responsibility. The role is represented as an exact set of responsibilities 
(lines 5 to 11) and to illustrate the SoD, suppose that BudgetManager is a sub-role of 
ProjectManager and that an employee may not have access to both roles 
BudgetManager and BuyerOfficer together (line 13). Finally, the hierarchical is 
represented using the rdfs constraint subClassOf at the roles layer. Line 26 represents 
the role project manager which is the superior hierarchical role of the buyer officer. 
 
1 ProjectManager rdfs:subClassOf rbac:Role 
2 BudgetManager rdfs:subClassOf rbac:Responsibility 
3 TeamManager rdfs:subClassOf rbac:Responsibility 
4 OutcomesManager rdfs:subClassOf rbac:Responsibility 
5 owl:Class rdf:ID="ProjectManager" 
6    owl:oneOf rdf:parseType=”Collection” 
7       owl:Thing rdf:about=”BudgetManager” 
8       owl:Thing rdf:about=”TeamManager” 
9       owl:Thing rdf:about=”OutcomesManager” 
10    /owl:one of 
11 /owl:Class 
12 BuyerOfficer rdfs:subClassOf rbac:Role 
13 BudgetManager owl:disjointWith BuyerOfficer 
14 PermittedBuyAction a rdfs:Class 
15    rdfs subClassOf rbac:PermittedAction, 
16    owl:equivalentClass [ 
17       a owl:Class 
18       owl:intersectionOf 
19         ( Buy 
20            [ a owl:Restriction 
21                owl:allValuesFrom ex:BudgetManager 
22                owl:onProprty rbac:subject 
23            ] 
24         ) 
25      ] 
26 BuyerOfficer rdfs:subClassOf ProjectManager 
Fig. 6. Illustration of responsibility-RBAC representation in OWL 
5   Related work regarding the translation of RBAC into policy 
This section explains how our approach handles the weakness of other ones related to 
the translation of RBAC into policy. From the existing work, we focus our review on 
what we consider are the two most significant ones: ROWLBAC and XACML+OWL. 
In ROWLBAC [9], Finin et al. propose two approaches to define an OWL domain to 
represents RBAC. In the first approach, the role is considered as a class. The 
hierarchy between roles is represented using subClassOf and the SoD is represented 
using the property disjointWith. The association of permission or prohibition to role is 
achieved with an OWL class expression equivalent to our representation of the 
permission to responsibility assignment. The second approach (figure 7) models a role 
as an instance of the generic role and uses the ObjectProperty role to link a subject to 
her possible role (lines 2 to 4). The hierarchy between roles, SoD and the permission 
to role association is represented by the creation of a new property, respectively: 
subRole (lines 5 to 7), ssod (for static SoD, lines 8 to 10), dsod (for dynamic SoD) 
and permitted (lines 11 to 13). Figure 8 illustrates that second approach. 
 
1 rbac:Role a owl:Class 
2 rbac:Role owl:ObjectProperty 
3    rdfs:domain rbac:Subject 
4    rdfs:range rbac:Role 
5 rbac:subRole owl:TransitivePropety 
6    rdfs:domain rbac:Role 
7    rdfs:range rbac:Role 
8 rbac:ssod owl:symmetricProperty, owl:TransitiveProperty 
9    rdfs:domain rbac:Role 
10    rdfs:range rbac:Role 
11 rbac:permitted rdfs:propety 
12    rdfs:domain rbac:Role 
13    rdfs:range Action 
Fig. 7. ROWLBAC second approach representation in OWL 
1 BudgetManager rbac:subRole ProjectManager 
2 BudgetManager rbac:ssod BuyerOfficer 
3 BudgetManager rbac:permitted Buy 
Fig. 8. Illustration of ROWLBAC second approach representation in OWL 
For Ferrini et al. [8], the analysis of both ROWLBAC representations [9] shows 
that the first approach has the disadvantage of being inconsistent when 2 classes (Di 
and Dj) are at the same time included (according to the role-hierarchy) and subject to 
SoD. Ferrini et al. also uses the ROWLBAC second approach to model RBAC in 
OWL (namely, the association between a subject and a role is represented by the 
ObjectProperty hasRole(subject,Role)). However, this has the disadvantage that 
constraints applying to properties to bind roles together (such as for DSoD or SSoD) 
is not handled by the standard DL-reasoner [8]. Ferrini et al. defines a framework to 
integrate XACML and OWL ontologies for supporting RBAC. It proposes to 
decouple the management of constraints such as the SoD from the specification and 
enforcement of XACML policies. The framework includes a critical module to 
support the DSoD that is based on an obligation to update the ontology with the 
information related to permissions granted to a subject. The principle is that when a 
DSoD exists and when a permission has already been granted to a subject, the 
obligation to update the ontology for another permission (that may not be assigned to 
the subject during the same session) will fail because it results in an inconsistency in 
the ontology. The failure of that obligation results in the denial of the second 
permission. 
In XACML+OWL, a role is represented as a class and the hierarchy by the 
ObjectProperty subRoleOf (Role, Role). The SoD is represented with the property 
disjointWith. The disadvantage is that it solves the translation of the SoD constraint 
with the manipulation of an obligation generator module that supports the automatic 
creation of policy. This solution is not simple and could be complex to deploy in 
practice. 
The responsibility-RBAC model proposes an innovative approach to represent both 
of those constraints: 
- In RBAC, the SoD is positioned at the role level and specifies that two roles 
may not be activated together. We position the SoD at the responsibility 
level (figure 3) and state that two responsibilities may not be activated 
together. This improvement limits the SoD strictly to the concerned 
responsibilities and allows an employee to remain assigned to many roles 
under the condition that all responsibilities that compose that roles respect 
the SoD constraint. If this is not the case, conflicting responsibilities must be 
assigned to another employee. 
- RBAC positions the concept of role-hierarchy at the role level (figure 3). We 
keep it as it is, since we agree that the hierarchy reflects the structure 
between job functions. 
6   Conclusions and future works 
In this paper we have proposed improvements to some aspect of business IT 
alignment by refining the assignment of permissions to users based on their business 
responsibilities. To achieve that, we have proposed an extension to RBAC with 
responsibility aspect to form the responsibility-RBAC model.  
The main contributions are: the optimization of the number of roles by enhancing 
RBAC with the concept of responsibility and the association of permissions to 
responsibility, requiring an employee‟s explicit commitment regarding the tasks they 
are responsible for, and the representation of the responsibility-RBAC in OWL, 
including a new perspective to represent the constraint of SoD and hierarchy. 
Future work will complete the innovative responsibility-RBAC model, deal with 
some of the above listed issues such as the translation of the model onto policies and 
evaluate our proposals with real case studies. 
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